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Summary 
The article examines public-private sector wage differentials in Spain using microdata from the Structure 
of Earnings Survey (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial). When applying various decomposition techniques, 
we find that it is important to distinguish by gender and type of contract. Our results also highlight the pres-
ence of a positive wage premium for public sector workers that can be partially explained by their better 
endowment of characteristics, in particular by the characteristics of the establishment where they work. The 
wage premium is greater for female and fixed-term employees and falls across the wage distribution, being 
negative for more highly skilled workers. 
Keywords: Public-private sector wage gap; wage distribution; matched employer-employee data; de-
composition methods. 
JEL classification: C2, E3, J3, J4. 
1. Introduction 
The existence of wage differentials between public and private sector workers and the 
analysis of its origin has received considerable attention over the last few decades (see, for 
example, Smith, 1976a, 1976b, Dustmann and van Soest, 1998 and Hartog and Oosterberck, 
1993 and, among more recent contributions, Lucifora and Meurs, 2006, Cai and Liu, 2011 
and Chatterji et al., 2011). There are several reasons why the wages of public sector work-
ers might potentially differ from those of their private sector counterparts. Among these rea-
sons, particular emphasis has been afforded to such factors as the public sector’s monopoly 
* This study received financial support from research projects ECO2010-16006, ECO2010-16934 and CSO2011-
29943-C03-02. 
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power in its provision of public services and its potential impact on public workers’ wages; 
the presence of compensatory wage differentials of non-pecuniary working conditions and, 
the greater bargaining power of public workers resulting, among other circumstances, from 
their higher rates of union membership (Gregory and Borland, 1999 and Bender, 1998). 
Among the regularities identified in the large body of empirical studies that have addressed 
this issue in many countries, it should be stressed the existence, with few exceptions, of a 
public sector wage premium when comparing workers with similar productivity-related 
characteristics. Moreover, this premium is usually reported as being higher for women and 
low-skilled workers whereas, on the other hand, wage inequality levels tend to be compara-
tively smaller in the public sector (Gregory and Borland, 1999). 
The aim of this article is to examine wage differentials between public and private sec-
tor workers in Spain, an economy where few analyses of this type have been undertaken to 
date (Lassibille, 1998, Albert et al., 1999, García-Pérez and Jimeno, 2007 and Hospido and 
Moral, 2013). In addition to examining these differences by gender and across the whole 
wage distribution, a separate study is conducted for workers on permanent and fixed-term 
contracts, a clearly necessary analysis in the particular case of Spain’s labour market and 
which, to the best of our knowledge, has yet to be undertaken. Indeed, there are various rea-
sons why the Spanish case constitutes an especially appropriate framework for conducting 
this type of analysis. Firstly, because the public-private sector wage gap in Spain is compar-
atively high from an international perspective, being ranked above the EU average (De Cas-
tro et al., 2013). Secondly, because in Spain, as in other European countries, in recent years 
the question of fiscal consolidation has been tackled specifically by adjusting public work-
ers’ wages. Finally, because Spain presents a very high rate of fixed-term employment in 
both its private and public sectors [according to Eurostat, in the year covered by this study 
–that is, 2010, Spain had the highest rate of fixed-term employment in the public sector in 
Europe (24.5!) and the second highest rate in the private sector (25.1!), being ranked well 
above the EU average of 13.9!, in both cases]. This is due in the first instance to the very 
large discrepancy in the costs of terminating permanent and fixed-term contracts and to a 
business structure clearly geared towards low-tech production (Dolado et al., 2002 and To-
haria et al., 2005) and, in the second, to elements such as budget constraints and structural 
weaknesses in the financing of the country’s local authorities (Consejo Económico y Social, 
2005). 
The study employs various decomposition techniques and uses data from the 2010 wave 
of the Spanish Structure of Earnings Survey (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial), which pro-
vides the greatest public sector coverage. An additional feature of this source is that it is a 
matched employer-employee dataset, a type of data that has had a significant impact on wage 
determination analyses in general (Hamermesh, 2008 and Abowd and Kramarz, 1999) but 
whose use in the analysis of public-private sector wage differentials has been rare to date 
(among recent studies, only Chatterji, Mumford and Smith, 2011, and De Castro et al., 2013 
use matched microdata). Among other advantages, the use of these data facilitates an exam-
ination of the contribution to public-private sector wage differentials of establishment char-
acteristics, attributes that are often not given the necessary weight in this type of analysis. 
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The obtained results reveal a significant wage differential in Spain in favour of public 
sector workers, a differential that is largely explained by the differences in the endowments 
of the observed characteristics of public and private sector workers, especially those of male 
employees. Likewise, establishment characteristics are found to make a significant contribu-
tion to the differential, greater than individual or job characteristics. Other notable findings 
include the presence of a positive wage premium associated with working in the public sec-
tor that is not explained by the endowments of productive characteristics in the case of low 
skilled workers and a negative premium for high skilled workers, and lower levels of wage 
inequality in the public sector that cannot be attributed to differences between the character-
istics of these workers and those of the private sector. Finally, the evidence obtained also 
confirms that there are significant differences associated with the type of contract in relation 
to both the size of the wage gap between the public and private sectors and to its origin. 
Among these, the presence of significant differences in the size of the wage premium asso-
ciated with working in the public sector should be stressed, since the premium is compara-
tively smaller for men on fixed-term contracts and for women on permanent contracts. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In the second section the literature exam-
ining wage differentials between the public and private sectors and by types of contract is re-
viewed. The database used in the study is presented in the third section, while the fourth sec-
tion focuses on the econometric methodologies used in the empirical analysis. The evidence 
obtained is presented in the fifth section and the study finishes summarising the main con-
clusions. 
2. Literature review 
The analysis conducted in this study considers two strands of the empirical literature on 
wage differentials: on the one hand, that which for decades has analysed the public-private 
sector wage gap; and, on the other, the more recent strand that addresses the study of wage 
differentials by type of contract. 
2.1. Public-private sector wage differentials
Numerous studies have undertaken analyses of the wage gap between the public and the 
private sectors in a broad manner, both temporally and spatially, since the seminal analyses 
of Smith (1976a, 1976b) for the United States. Those former studies estimate a Mincerian 
wage equation, using a dummy variable identifying public sector workers, and reveal the 
presence of a public sector wage premium. Despite their limitations, the same methodology 
has been applied in many subsequent studies in the field and these, with few exceptions, es-
timate a positive wage premium for public sector workers, a premium that is comparatively 
higher for women and in less developed countries (Giordano et al., 2011 and Depalo et al., 
2013). Following the methodology proposed by Oaxaca and Blinder (Oaxaca, 1973 and 
Blinder, 1973), an alternative line of analysis has subsequently based its analysis on the de-
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composition of the wage gap between sectors into the effects attributable to differences in 
characteristics and in the returns to these characteristics (the latter component reflecting the 
wage premium paid by the public sector to workers with the same productivity-related char-
acteristics as those of workers in the private sector). The results of this approach emphasize 
that the differences in these characteristics normally account for most of the public-private 
wage gap, but also confirm the presence of a positive public sector wage premium, which is 
greater for women (Belman and Heywood, 1988, Gunderson, 1979 and Rees and Shah, 
1995). 
The presence of a possible selection bias arising from the fact that individuals who 
choose to work in the public sector may have unobservable characteristics that differ from 
those presented by private sector workers, led to the estimation of endogenous switching re-
gression models (Hartog and Oosterbeck, 1993, Dustman and van Soest, 1998, Zweimuller 
and Winter-Ebmer, 1994, Adamchick and Bedi, 2000 and Christopoulou and Monastiriotis, 
2013). The results of such studies, however, do not always coincide, because while for most 
countries it is found that when controlling for selection bias the wage premium widens, in 
some cases the gap is closed and, moreover, the magnitude of the selection effect differs 
greatly between studies. This may be related to the difficulty of accessing variables in the 
available databases that constitute credible exclusion restrictions and which allow the selec-
tion bias to be corrected (Siminski, 2013 and Budría, 2010). To overcome this difficulty, 
some studies present evidence from longitudinal databases that use fixed effects to control 
for workers’ time invariant characteristics and which, at the same time, allow the researcher 
to work with the subsample of workers that switch sectors. The usual finding of these stud-
ies is that the size of the public sector wage premium falls considerably in relation to those 
obtained using cross-sectional data, to the point that the premium even disappears in some 
cases (Krueger, 1988, Bargain and Melly, 2008, Siminski, 2013 and Campos and Centeno, 
2012). 
The existence, in general, of a lower wage dispersion in the public sector implies, in 
turn, that the analysis of the average wage differential provides an incomplete view of the 
different processes of wage determination in the public and private sectors. This has led sev-
eral authors to examine inter-sector wage differentials across the wage distribution using de-
composition techniques of differences in wage distributions (Poterba and Rueben, 1994, 
Melly, 2005a, Christopoulou and Monastiriotis, 2013, Cai and Liu, 2011, Lucifora and 
Meurs, 2006 and Depalo et al., 2013). Their results largely coincide, confirming that, in gen-
eral, the role of the characteristics varies at specific points in the wage distribution, so that 
the public sector wage premium is greater in the lower part of the distribution and becomes 
smaller in the higher quantiles, so as to at a given point the premium usually becomes neg-
ative. 
Finally, recent studies highlight the need to analyse wage differentials solely in the case 
of workers that are strictly comparable (that is, in the case of those whose observable char-
acteristics are present in both the public and private sectors). These studies undertake their 
analyses employing the matching methodology proposed by Ñopo (2008), which allows the 
             
                
           
          
              
              
             
            
                 
             
              
              
             
            
            
              
              
              
       
              
              
            
           
              
                 
            
            
           
                
             
            
            
               
              
             
          
             
              
          111 Public-Private Sector Wage Differentials by Type of Contract: Evidence from Spain 
common support of the distributions and its impact on the decomposition of wage differen-
tials to be established between sectors, and in some cases they find that the number of fully 
comparable individuals between the two sectors is very small (Ramoni-Perazzi and Bellante, 
2006, Gimpelson and Lukiyanova, 2009 and Mizala et al., 2011).
Compared to the vast body of international literature in this field, evidence of the pub-
lic-private sector wage gap in Spain is comparatively small and, with few exceptions, is not 
very recent. Thus, Lassibille (1998), Albert et al. (1999) and García-Pérez and Jimeno (2005 
and 2007) have estimated endogenous regression models for various years between 1990 and 
2001, and Giordano et al. (2011), Depalo et al. (2013) and De Castro et al. (2013) have in-
cluded Spain in their comparative analyses of various European countries (in the latter case 
using the European Structure of Earnings Survey). There is a general consensus in their es-
timates of a high public sector wage premium, always higher for women. Hospido and Moral 
(2013) obtain similar results using a different data source, the Muestra Continua de Vidas 
Laborales. García-Pérez and Jimeno (2005), Depalo et al. (2013) and Hospido and Moral 
(2013) also estimate quantile regressions, obtaining similar results to those obtained for other 
countries, namely a lower wage premium in the upper part of the wage distribution. When 
differentiating the sample by skill level, Hospido and Moral (2013) in fact obtain a negative 
wage premium for high-skilled public sector workers located in the upper part of the wage 
distribution. 
2.2. Wage differentials between permanent and fixed-term workers 
The second line of analysis refers to wage differentials by type of contract. Studies in 
this field were first undertaken in the early nineties and interest has been particularly intense 
in recent years, focused above all in certain countries, mainly European, characterized by 
their high proportion of fixed-term contracts. The most commonly used methodology con-
sists in estimating wage equations that incorporate a dummy variable to control for the type 
of contract and the usual finding is the presence in all economies of a wage penalty for fixed-
term workers (Jimeno and Toharia, 1993, Blanchard and Landier, 2002 and Gustafsson et 
al., 2001). More recent studies have undertaken comparative analyses, finding that the size 
of the wage penalty for fixed-term workers presents a significant international heterogene-
ity, being of an intermediate size in the case of Spain (Brown and Sessions, 2005, Comi and 
Grasseni, 2009 and Boeri, 2011). Other studies that control for the selection of individuals 
according to contract type find that the wage penalty for fixed-term workers undergoes 
changes when introducing this control, albeit that the sign varies between studies (Picchio, 
2006, Hagen, 2002 and Mertens et al., 2007). Finally, analyses in this line of research have 
been also undertaken across the entire distribution, with the finding that the wage penalty for 
fixed-term workers is usually greater in the lower part of the distribution (Mertens and 
McGinnity, 2004, Mertens et al., 2007 and Comi and Grasseni, 2009). 
Given the importance of fixed-term contracts in the Spanish labour market, this is un-
surprisingly one of the countries in which wage differentials by type of contract have been 
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studied most. Thus, Jimeno and Toharia (1993) and Hernanz (2003), when estimating wage 
equations with dummy variables for the type of contract, identify a wage penalty for fixed-
term workers. Likewise, after undertaking a decomposition exercise, De la Rica and 
Felgueroso (1999) conclude that much of the observed differential can be attributed to the 
better characteristics of the permanent workers. Similarly, Hernanz (2003), De la Rica 
(2004) and Davia and Hernanz (2004) estimate endogenous regression models in seeking to 
correct any selection bias and their results confirm that fixed-term workers do not constitute 
a random sample. Indeed, Davia and Hernanz (2004) report almost no discrimination and De 
la Rica (2004) finds a negative premium for those on fixed-term contracts of 10!. 
3. Data
The source from which the microdata used in this study are drawn is the 2010 wave of 
the Structure of Earnings Survey (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial, hereinafter, EES). The 
EES is conducted by Spain’s National Statistics Institute in line with a standardised method-
ology for all EU countries. The survey includes wage earners that have contributed to the So-
cial Security system throughout the whole month of October of the reference year and its de-
sign corresponds to a two-stage sampling of wage earners from the contribution accounts 
held by the Social Security. One of its most important features is, therefore, that it includes 
matched employer-employee microdata (i.e., observations for various workers employed in 
each establishment).
The EES consists of independent cross-sections that are produced every four years and 
at present four waves are available, corresponding to 1995, 2002, 2006 and 2010. The sur-
vey’s coverage has expanded over this period and, for the purposes of this research, it should 
be stressed that in 2010 it included for the first time the branch of activity corresponding to 
section O of the NACE-2009 classification: Public Administration and Defence; Compulso-
ry Social Security (so that the wave covers establishments of all sizes affiliated to the gen-
eral social security system whose economic activity falls under sections B to S of the NACE-
2009 classification of economic activities). This branch of activity constitutes a sizeable part 
of the public sector, since the only other public sector workers in other branches of activity 
are those employed in publicly controlled firms. Consequently, the 2010 wave of the survey 
provides a comprehensive coverage of the public sector and one that is greater in all circum-
stances than that provided by previous waves, which explains why this empirical analysis is 
limited to the 2010 wave. In delimiting the public and private sectors, the study considers 
public sector workers as those that in the dichotomous variable “Ownership or control of the 
company” are included in the category corresponding to public ownership or control (as op-
posed to private). This includes all individuals employed in the branch of activity of Public 
Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security, as well as those employed in pub-
lic enterprises in sections of activity other than these 1 .
The data source provides very detailed information about the workers’ wages and 
characteristics (sex, age, education and nationality); about their jobs (occupation, 
              
            
           
              
              
              
            
           
    
           
                  
                  
            
             
            
              
            
   
 
           
           
             
              
             
             
             
           
   
  
             
       
 
 
 
             
              
   
          113 Public-Private Sector Wage Differentials by Type of Contract: Evidence from Spain 
tenure, type of contract, type of employment, be it part- or full-time, and the undertak-
ing of supervisory tasks) and about the enterprises or establishments (sector of activity, 
size, type of collective agreement and region). Wage information includes the various 
components that make up the wage and covers different periods of time. The wage con-
cept used in the empirical analysis is the gross hourly wage, calculated from the wage 
corresponding to the month of October, divided by the number of hours worked in that 
month 2. Wages are expressed in gross terms and their calculation includes any payment 
made by the firm, including commissions, bonuses for working nightshifts or weekends, 
as well as overtime.
In conducting the empirical analysis certain individuals were excluded, namely, those of 
a nationality other than Spanish, those under the age of 16 or over the age of 65 and those 
with hourly wages of less than two and a half or more than two hundred euros. The final sam-
ple from the 2010 wave of the EES comprises 157,774 observations, 89,953 corresponding 
to men (71,428 on a permanent contract and 18,525 on a fixed-term contract) and 
67,821 women (52,239 on a permanent contract and 15,582 on a fixed-term contract). Of 
these, 23,416 (14.8! of the total) work in the public sector –10,067 men (11.2!) and 
13,349 women (19.7!) 3. The descriptive statistics of the sample can be consulted in Table 
A.1 in the Appendix. 
4. Methodology 
The study employs three different techniques for the decomposition of the public-private 
sector wage differentials in Spain. The first, the Oaxaca-Blinder methodology (Oaxaca, 1973 
and Blinder, 1973), allows a detailed decomposition of the average wage differential of in-
dividuals in both sectors. The second, a methodology proposed by Ñopo (2008), serves as a 
robustness check of the former, insofar as the decomposition takes into consideration the ef-
fect of the presence of individuals that share strictly the same observed characteristics. Fi-
nally, the third methodology, developed by Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011), provides a de-
tailed decomposition of the wage differentials across the wage distribution. The three 
techniques are described below. 
4.1. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
The Oaxaca-Blinder technique is based on the separate estimation for each group of the 
Mincerian type semi-logarithmic wage equation of the form: 
w = X β + ε (1) 
i i i 
where w
i 
corresponds to the logarithm of worker i’s gross hourly wage; X
i 
is a vector of in-
dividual explanatory variables plus a constant term; β is a vector of parameters and ε is a 
random error term.
i 
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The explanatory variables considered in the empirical analysis include individual char-
acteristics as well as job and establishment characteristics. The former serve as controls for 
the highest level of education attained by an individual (distinguishing three categories: pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary education) and age (comprising three groups: under 30, be-
tween 30 and 45 and over 45). The job characteristics include occupation (three categories 
corresponding to low-, medium- and high-skilled jobs, respectively); years of tenure in cur-
rent job (differentiating four groups: 0 to 3 years, 4 to 10, 11 to 20 and more than 20 years); 
the type of contract (permanent or fixed-term); the type of employment (full-time or part-
time) and the performing of supervisory tasks. Finally, the establishment characteristics in-
clude size (distinguishing four categories); the region of location and the type of collective 
agreement (distinguishing between single-establishment, national and sub-national sector 
agreements). 
After empirically estimating the wage structure of the labour market with the joint sam-
ple of individuals in the public and private sectors, and using the jointly estimated wage 
structure for the individuals of both sectors as the reference wage structure in the decompo-
sition (see Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994 and Neumark, 1988) 4, depending on the properties of 
the ordinary least squares estimator, the difference in the average wage of the public and pri-
vate sectors (Δ) can be decomposed as follows: 
∆ = W pub  W priv  = X pub  X priv βˆ * +{ pub β X ˆ priv ˆ ( – ) ( – ) ( – β*  )+    X priv βˆ*  βˆ pub( – )} (2) 
–
where pub 
– 
and  priv W
– – 
W are the average public and private sector wages; pub  X and Xpriv are
^ ^ the average observed characteristics of the individuals in both sectors  b pub and b priv,
 
^ and  * b are the coefficients estimated following the wage regression on the set of ex-
planatory variables for the public and private sectors and the two sectors pooled, re-
spectively. 
The first component on the right-hand side of equation (2) represents the effect on the 
average wage differential of the differences in characteristics (or the “explained” compo-
nent), while the second corresponds to the effect of the coefficients (or the “unexplained” 
component). It should also be noted that this procedure provides a detailed decomposition 
(i.e., distinguishing the contribution of each individual explanatory variable to the differen-
tial to be explained, differentiating, in turn, between the corresponding effects associated 
with endowments and returns). To avoid the identification problem that arises in this type 
of decomposition, associated with the fact that the choice of a specific reference in each 
group of explanatory dummy variables can in practice affect the results of the detailed de-
composition through the relative contribution of each explanatory variable to the returns 
component (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999), when estimating the equation the strategy of nor-
malization of dummy variables suggested by Yun (2005) was adopted, which allows the ac-
tual contribution of each variable to the returns component of the decomposition to be es-
timated. 
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4.2. Ñopo decomposition 
Ñopo (2008) proposes an alternative method to that of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposi-
tion which, using a non-parametric approach based on matching techniques, emphasizes the 
differences between the groups being compared in the supports of the distributions of ob-
servable characteristics and their impact on the results of the decomposition. The assump-
tion is that, as there may be differences in the observable characteristics of the workers in 
both sectors that lead to particular combinations of characteristics for which identical indi-
viduals cannot be found in both sectors, the results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
could be affected. This would occur to the extent that this technique assumes that estimates 
of the wage equations are also valid out of the support of the observable characteristics for 
which they are estimated, which would ultimately lead to an overstatement of that part of the 
wage differential unexplained by differences in the endowments of characteristics. Accord-
ingly, a decomposition is proposed that breaks down the differential wage to be explained 
into four terms, two of which are analogous to the elements of the Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position (but computed only over the common support of the distributions of characteristics), 
while the other two account for differences in the supports. 
Thus, in line with this methodology (for more details see Ñopo, 2008), and taking as our 
starting point equation (2), the public-private sector wage differential can be expressed in 
terms of four additive elements: 
Δ = (ΔEXP + ΔPUB + ΔPRIV) + ΔUNEXP (3) 
where ΔEXP is the part of the average public-private sector wage gap (Δ) that can be ex-
plained by differences in the distributions of the characteristics of workers in the public 
and private sectors over the common support; ΔPUB is the part of the wage gap that is ex-
plained by the existence of public sector employees that are not present in the common 
support of the distributions of characteristics and ΔPRIV is the part of the wage gap that 
can be explained by the presence of private sector workers out of the common support. Fi-
nally, ΔUNEXP is the unexplained part of the wage gap (i.e., that part of the difference 
that is attributed to unobservable characteristics or to different returns between the two 
groups in the observable characteristics). By analogy with the Oaxaca-Blinder decompo-
sition, the sum of the first three elements corresponds to the component “explained” by 
differences in the characteristics, while the fourth term corresponds to the “unexplained” 
component.
To be able to apply this procedure, Ñopo (2008) proposes applying matching methods 
to simultaneously identify the common support (those groups of workers in the public and 
private sectors with similar observable characteristics) and decompose the wage differential 
in line with equation (3) without imposing any restrictions on the way in which the explana-
tory variables affect the dependent variable. A notable feature of this method is that the re-
sults of the decomposition tend to coincide with those obtained with the Oaxaca-Blinder de-
composition when the common support includes all the individuals analysed (i.e., if ΔPUB 
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and ΔPRIV take a null value) (Ñopo, 2008). However, its main drawback is that it can be af-
fected by the ‘curse’ of high dimensionality, since the inclusion of a large number of ex-
planatory variables for matching can substantially reduce the number of observations found 
in the common support. 
4.3. The Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo decomposition 
Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011) have recently proposed a technique for empirically 
decomposing differences between two distributions of a variable. Ultimately, it provides 
a decomposition of the differences that exist between the distributions in the value of any 
distributional statistic, such as the value of a quantile or an inequality index, depending on 
the differences in observable characteristics and in the returns to these observables, re-
spectively. It is a procedure that has a notable advantage over comparable techniques pro-
posed in the economics literature and which also allow empirical decompositions of dif-
ferences between distributions based on the construction of counterfactual distributions 
(DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993, Machado and Mata, 
2005 and Melly, 2005b, 2006). Thus, while these techniques consist of aggregate decom-
positions which, with some partial exceptions, provide only the separate effects of the set 
of characteristics and returns, Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo’s (2011) technique provides a de-
tailed decomposition that allows, in addition, knowledge of the individual contribution of 
each explanatory variable considered in the analysis via the characteristics and returns 
components. 
This technique is based on the estimation of a regression in which the independent vari-
able (the wage) is replaced by a wage transformation, the recentered influence function 
(hereinafter, RIF), so as to be able to undertake a standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of 
any distributional statistic based on the regression results (for further details, see Fortin, 
Lemieux and Firpo, 2011). The decomposition takes the following form: 
pub priv pub priv * pub priv * X priv * ˆ pub∆ = (W – W ) = (X – X )βˆ +{X (βˆ – βˆ ) + (βˆ – β )} (4) 
where ∆
Qq 
is the difference in the quantile Q
q 
(or, as stated before, in any other statistic) of 
– – 
the wage distributions of the public and private sectors; Xpub and Xpriv are the average ob-
g pub g^ privserved characteristics of the public and private sectors and ^ , and g ^* are the coeffi-
Qq Qq Qq
cients estimated after the regression of the RIF variable of the quantile Q on the set of ex-
q
planatory variables for the public sector, private sector and the two sectors pooled, 
respectively 5. The first component of the right-hand side of the equation represents the ef-
fect on the differential between distributions caused by differences in characteristics (the 
“explained” component), while the second corresponds to the effect of the coefficients (the 
“unexplained” component) and, as noted above, in each of them the contribution of each in-
dividual explanatory variable can be distinguished. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive evidence
Table 1 and figure 1 contain information on the wage differential observed between the 
public and private sectors in Spain, measured in logarithms of hourly wages and expressed 
in a disaggregated form for male and female workers and, within these groups, for those on 
permanent or fixed-term contracts. They show a highly significant differential in favour of 
public sector workers, and one that is substantially higher for women (0.463 log points) than 
it is for men (0.352 points). A similar differential is found in favour of workers on perma-
nent contracts (with a gap of 0.377 points for men and 0.497 for women) in comparison with 
workers on fixed-term contracts (0.314 and 0.461, respectively). Furthermore, the wage dif-
ferential between the two sectors is also found not to be homogenous across the whole wage 
distribution, it being relatively lower in the two tails of the distribution than in the central 
part. This occurs regardless of the gender of the workers but not of the type of contract, be-
cause the wage differential, unlike the rest, presents in general an increasing profile for in-
dividuals on fixed-term contracts. 
Table 2 contains information on wage inequality in both sectors, measured using the 
Gini coefficient. The table shows that inequality levels are systematically lower in the pub-
lic sector than they are in the private, regardless of the gender of the workers. This is the 
case, however, only of individuals on permanent contracts, since, by contrast, in the case of 
workers on fixed-term contracts there are no statistically significant differences in wage in-
equality between the two sectors at conventional levels. 
Figure 1. Public-private sector wage differentials across the wage distribution 
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Table 1
 
PuBLIC-PRIvaTE SECTOR WagE DIFFEREnTIaLS In SPaIn
 
Male Female 
all Permanent Fixed-term all Permanent Fixed-term 
Average 0.352 0.377 0.314 0.463 0.497 0.461 
Percentiles 
10 0.327 0.404 0.168 0.429 0.506 0.329 
20 0.382 0.434 0.223 0.463 0.516 0.394 
30 0.416 0.450 0.290 0.489 0.534 0.418 
40 0.431 0.468 0.342 0.514 0.543 0.456 
50 0.441 0.449 0.372 0.529 0.550 0.493 
60 0.413 0.407 0.388 0.538 0.556 0.549 
70 0.370 0.370 0.414 0.529 0.556 0.581 
80 0.328 0.316 0.393 0.489 0.489 0.558 
90 0.265 0.245 0.417 0.383 0.375 0.555 
Notes: The table shows the public-private sector differential of the logarithm of the hourly wage. 
Table 2 
PuBLIC-PRIvaTE SECTOR WagE InEquaLITy In SPaIn. gInI COEFFICIEnT 
all 
Male Female 
Permanent Fixed-term all Permanent Fixed-term 
 Public sector 
 Private  sector
 Differential
0.089 
0.109 
–0.020* 
0.080 
0.109 
–0.029* 
0.104 
0.100 
0.004 
0.089 
0.109 
–0.020* 
0.081 
0.110 
–0.029* 
0.099 
0.096 
0.003 
* Indicates that the difference between the two sectors is statistically significant at the 1! level. 
Table A.1 in the appendix contains the descriptive statistics for the sample used in the analy-
sis. These statistics reveal significant differences in the characteristics of workers employed in 
the public and private sectors. Without seeking to be exhaustive, the public sector workers have 
on average, irrespective of their sex and contract type, higher levels of education, work experi-
ence (proxied by age) and length of tenure; they are characterized by their greater presence in 
occupations requiring high-skill levels, in full-time work and on fixed-term contracts, and the 
majority work in large establishments covered by single-establishment collective agreements. 
5.2. Econometric decompositions: average wage differentials
Table 3 contains the results of the decomposition of the average public-private sector 
wage differential obtained with the Oaxaca-Blinder technique. The information includes the 
size of the average wage differential, the values of the two components on the right-hand 
side of equation (2), and the detailed results for each of the two components (characteristics 
and coefficients) based on the contribution of each individual explanatory variable. A posi-
tive value for any of these components indicates that it is an element that originates a posi-
tive wage differential for individuals working in the public sector.
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Based on the results of the decomposition, in the case of men, the bulk of the average 
public-private sector wage differential (0.352 log points) is explained by differences in the 
endowment of characteristics (0.312), the contribution of the unexplained component –or 
wage premium– being much less relevant (0.041). This holds true for employees on perma-
nent contracts and for those on fixed-term contracts. Thus, among permanent workers in 
both sectors there is an average wage differential of 0.378 log points, 0.311 of which are ex-
plained by the characteristics component, so that the estimated wage premium would be 
0.067 points. In the case of fixed-term workers, characteristics explain 0.281 of the 
0,314 points of difference, and so in this case the public sector wage premium (0.033 points) 
is lower than that of the permanent workers. The results of the detailed decomposition show 
that although several individual variables exhibit a significant explanatory power (including 
the level of education 6, tenure and occupation), the establishment characteristics play a 
prominent role. Thus, size alone explains a third of the characteristics component for all 
male workers (this proportion being slightly lower for men on fixed-term contracts) and, 
overall, the failure to consider the establishment characteristics means that the part explained 
by the characteristics falls from 0.312 to 0.169 log points. 
The average wage differential for women (0.463 log points) can also largely be ex-
plained by differences in the endowment of characteristics (0.325). However, the wage pre-
mium in this case (0.138) is comparatively more significant than that of male workers, with 
a premium that more than triples that of their male counterparts. Unlike the men’s, the 
women’s wage premium is particularly high for workers on fixed-term contracts 
(0.214 points), and is significantly higher than that of permanent employees (0.126). Here, 
the individual variables with a notable explanatory power coincide with those for the male 
workers (most obviously education, length of tenure, occupation, and establishment size), al-
though in this case the characteristics of the establishments have a less notable relative 
weight. 
The results obtained up to this juncture allow us to conclude that in Spain there are sig-
nificant wage differentials between workers in the public and private sectors, both for all 
the workers and distinguishing in terms of contract type, while the bulk of the differential 
can be explained by differences in observed productivity-related characteristics. However, 
there may be differences in the observable characteristics of the workers in the two sectors 
that lead to combinations for which it is not possible to find identical individuals, and this 
may well affect the results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. For this reason, and in 
order to check the robustness of the evidence obtained, Ñopo’s (2008) methodology was 
used, the results of which are presented in Table 4 based on a consideration of different 
groups of characteristics. Thus, first the individual characteristics (age and education) are 
considered; followed by the variables related to the job (tenure, type of employment, type 
of contract, tasks of supervision and occupation) and, finally, those relating to the charac-
teristics of the establishment (region, firm size and type of collective agreement). In addi-
tion to the four elements of the equation (3), Table 4 also shows the percentage of workers 
in the public and private sectors that form part of the common support (CSPUB and 
CSPRIV, respectively). 
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It is found that the percentage of workers included under the common support remains 
at a high level (quite close to 1) until the characteristics of the establishments are consid-
ered, when the percentage falls substantially. The most important component of the wage 
differential up to this point is the unexplained portion (ΔUNEXP), which accounts for about 
two thirds of the total differential, but when the establishment’s characteristics are consid-
ered the contribution of this component falls significantly. The wage premium attributable 
to the public sector is, in fact, substantially lower according to the results of this method 
(being almost null in the case of men and presenting a value of 0.087 points in the case of 
women, which contrast with the values of 0.041 and 0.138, respectively, obtained with the 
Oaxaca-Blinder technique). The evidence also suggests that the main explanatory compo-
nent when considering the set of independent variables arises from the existence of private 
sector workers that remain out of the common support as they have no counterpart in the 
public sector (ΔPRIV). In any case, these results serve to reinforce the consideration that 
the characteristics of the establishments are a noteworthy determinant of the public-private 
sector wage differential. 
5.3. Econometric decompositions: differentials across the wage distribution 
The next step in the empirical analysis involves examining the origin of the wage dif-
ferentials between sectors across the whole wage distribution. To do this, the evidence 
obtained after applying the methodology proposed by Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo is pre-
sented. Tables 5-7 and figures 2-4 contain the results (shown separately for each of the 
groups considered in the decomposition of the public-private sector differential) for the 
Gini coefficient and the logarithm of the hourly wage by quantiles. To facilitate presen-
tation, Figure 2 distinguishes only between the aggregate contribution of the characteris-
tics and returns components, while figures 3 and 4 show the detailed results of the indi-
vidual effects of each of the explanatory variables associated with the two components. 
Here again, to facilitate presentation, the explanatory variables are grouped into individ-
ual characteristics (age and education), job characteristics (tenure, contract, employment 
type, supervision and occupation) and establishment characteristics (the remaining vari-
ables considered).
The evidence shows that the causes of the observed wage differential between all the 
workers of the public and private sector differ significantly across the wage distribution (the 
results being relatively similar for men and women). Thus, the contribution of the differ-
ences in the endowment of characteristics is relatively low on the left-hand side of the dis-
tribution, which presents a clearly upward profile, so that there is a particularly strong influ-
ence in the right tail (figure 2). The contribution of the unexplained component, meanwhile, 
presents a downward profile, to the extent that it acquires negative values in the upper part 
of the distribution. These results suggest, therefore, that while the comparatively less-skilled 
individuals receive a significant positive wage premium in the public sector, the most high-
ly skilled individuals receive a lower wage than the one they would obtain in the private sec-
tor with their observed characteristics. 
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Figure 2. aggregate decomposition of the public-private sector wage differentials 
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When distinguishing by type of contract, however, the results are found to differ for 
fixed-term workers and permanent employees, albeit that the latter’s results largely coincide 
with those of the overall analysis. These differences are particularly marked in the case of 
women on fixed-term contracts, for whom the contribution of both components is very sim-
ilar across virtually all the distribution (with the exception of its two tails). Thus, the wage 
premium of fixed-term workers in the public sector is relatively homogeneous across the en-
tire distribution (except for the first decile of the distribution, in which it is smaller). In the 
case of men on fixed-term contracts, the component explained by characteristics presents a 
growing weight across virtually the entire distribution, while the wage premium is relative-
ly stable in the lower half of the distribution, falling thereafter to become negative in the 
upper quartile. 
In short, in line with the evidence presented in previous studies for both Spain and other 
countries, the wage premium paid by the public sector is higher for low-skilled workers, and 
this premium decreases as we move towards higher levels in the wage distribution, becom-
ing clearly negative for the most highly skilled employees. However, the analysis conduct-
ed here reveals a new result, as the fall in the wage premium for the high-skilled workers is 
not so clear in the case of those on fixed-term contracts, since among the male workers it is 
only recorded in the upper half of the wage distribution, and it is not observed at all for 
women on fixed-term contracts.
The results of the detailed decomposition of the characteristics component (figure 3) 
confirm that the establishment characteristics present a more significant contribution across 
the wage distribution than the respective contributions of individual or job characteristics to 
the public-private sector wage differential in the case of men, while for women their influ-
ence is relatively similar to those of the other characteristics. They also show that the upward 
profile observed for the whole set of the characteristics component is repeated in all the sub-
sets of the explanatory variables. The detailed decomposition of the wage premium compo-
nents (figure 4) points to some additional issues of interest. Thus, for both sexes the wage 
premium associated with individual characteristics is positive for fixed-term workers, while 
it is negative for permanent employees. The analysis that does not differentiate by type of 
contract presents a result that clearly disguises a number of competing situations. The wage 
premium when controlling for job characteristics is positive for men and negative for 
women, because of the significant negative wage premium received by fixed-term workers 
in the public sector associated with these characteristics. Finally, the wage premium when 
controlling for the establishment characteristics is only slightly significant for all groups, ex-
cept that of low-skilled men in stable employment. 
Finally, evidence regarding the origin of the differences in the public-private sector 
wage inequality (table 7) reveals that the lowest levels of inequality in the public sector can-
not be explained by a composition effect, since the relative endowments of characteristics 
presented by individuals in the public sector are a factor that, ceteris paribus, would lead to 
greater wage inequality in all the groups analysed. Thus, the origin of this phenomenon is 
fully explained by the contribution of the returns component (again across all groups, with 
130 RAÒL RAMOS, ESTEBAN SANROMÂ AND HIPÏLITO SIMÏN 
Figure 3. Detailed decomposition of the public-private sector wage differentials.
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Figure 4. Detailed decomposition of the public-private sector wage differentials. 
Effect of the coefficients
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the exception of fixed-term female workers, for whom this component is not statistically sig-
nificant). As such, this evidence suggests that the lower wage inequality in the public sector
 
is attributable solely to the differences in the wage-setting mechanisms of the private sector.
 
6. Conclusions 
This study has analysed public-private sector wage differentials in Spain employing 
matched employer-employee microdata obtained from the most recent wave of the Structure 
of Earnings Survey (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial). In addition to examining these differ-
ences separately by gender and across the wage distribution, a separate analysis is conduct-
ed here for the first time examining the wage gap between workers on permanent and fixed-
term contracts in both sectors. This situation has not been studied to date, and is justified, 
among other factors, by the fact that the high number of fixed-term contracts in both the pri-
vate and public sectors makes the Spanish labour market quite distinct in comparative terms. 
The empirical analysis of the origin of the wage gap between sectors has been undertak-
en employing various decomposition techniques. The results of this analysis show that, in 
line with evidence from previous studies, the bulk of the significant wage differential ob-
served in Spain in favour of public sector workers can be explained by their different endow-
ments of observed characteristics, while the size of the resulting pay premium is appreciably 
higher in the case of women. The evidence obtained also suggests that the establishment 
characteristics make a greater contribution to the differential than individual or job charac-
teristics. This is confirmed by implementing the procedure proposed by Ñopo (2008), the re-
sults of which suggest that the failure to consider the establishment characteristics most like-
ly causes an overestimation of the public sector wage premium. It is also found that the 
origin of the total wage differential between the public and private sectors differs significant-
ly across the wage distribution, increasing on the left-hand side and decreasing on the right, 
so that in Spain, in common with other countries, there is a positive wage premium associ-
ated with working in the public sector for low-skilled individuals, while a negative wage pre-
mium is found in the case of the high-skilled workers. Finally, the lower levels of wage in-
equality observed in the public sector cannot be explained by differences in the 
characteristics of workers in the public and private sectors, but seem to be attributable to the 
particularities of their wage-setting mechanisms. 
The evidence obtained also confirms that there are significant differences associated 
with the type of contract with regards to both the size of the wage gap between the public 
and private sectors and to its origin. Thus, in relation to the first difference, it is observed 
that the wage differential in favour of the public sector is comparatively higher for perma-
nent workers; that the wage differential presents an increasing profile for individuals on 
fixed-term contracts but, on the contrary, is decreasing for those on a permanent contract, 
and that the highest levels of wage inequality in the public sector occur only in the case of 
individuals on a permanent contract. In relation to the second point, significant differences 
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are found by type of contract in the size of the wage premium (the premium being compar-
atively lower for individuals on fixed-term contracts in the case of men and for those on per-
manent contracts in the case of women) and in the origin of the wage differential between 
sectors across the wage distribution (highlighting the relatively homogeneous wage premi-
um across the wage distribution that is observed for women on fixed-term contracts). 
The analysis inevitably suffers certain limitations that, due to the characteristics of the 
database used, cannot be addressed. The first concerns the possible selection bias associated 
with the choice of sector (public or private) made by the workers, and which stems from the 
possibility that this decision is related to unobserved characteristics that simultaneously affect 
wages. The method usually employed to correct this problem (the estimation of endogenous 
switching models) requires, however, the use of credible exclusion restrictions, which are al-
ways difficult to achieve and that are not actually available in the Encuesta de Estructura 
Salarial. Likewise, to the extent that this information source is composed of cross-sectional 
data, it is not possible to control for the unobservable heterogeneity of individuals, something 
that many previous studies have achieved by introducing individual fixed effects in the con-
text of panel data, or to examine the wage impact associated with a change of sector. 
To conclude, in the period following the specific year covered by this study (that is, 
2010), significant changes have occurred in the Spanish economy affecting wages in both 
the public and private sectors. In the case of the former, public sector wages have been af-
fected by severe adjustments implemented within a framework of fiscal consolidation. They 
may also have been affected by the great number of job losses –a phenomenon limited to the 
private sector at the beginning of the economic crisis– that have subsequently been record-
ed in the public sector. In the case of the latter, the intense regulatory changes in collective 
bargaining that constituted part of the 2012 labour reform may well have meant significant 
changes to wage determination processes, especially in the private but also in the public sec-
tor. As such, it would be of undoubted interest to consider in the future the evolution of pub-
lic-private sector wage differentials in Spain in the period immediately following the one ex-
amined in this article. 
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notes 
1.	 Thus, the public workers considered in this study include all kinds of civil servants. However, note that it only 
includes those affiliated to the general social security system, and so it does not include, given that they do not 
form part of the EES, those affiliated to mutual societies or minority social security systems covering such 
areas as justice or the armed forces. 
2.	 October’s wage is taken as the reference, since being employed in that month is the requisite that defines the 
survey population. The total number of hours worked in that month is calculated as the worker’s normal work-
ing week in October multiplied by 4.35, plus the number of overtime hours worked. 
3.	 In order to examine the actual coverage of the public sector of the EES, a comparison was made with the En-
cuesta de Población Activa (using information corresponding to the third quarter of 2010 in the case of the 
EPA). When the comparison is restricted to the sectors covered by the EES, although the survey seems to suf-
fer from a certain underestimation of the public sector, in general the coverage is high. Thus, public sector em-
ployees constitute 14.8! of all employees according to the EES and 22.2! according to EPA data, the per-
centages being 11.2! and 18.5! in the case of men and 19.7! and 26.7! for women. This underestimation 
of the public sector by the EES can be attributed to the fact that it does not include public sector workers af-
filiated to mutual societies and minority social security systems. 
4.	 The estimation of the reference wage structure also includes a dummy variable for the group membership of 
each observation, since failure to do so can lead to a bias in the decomposition, given that the characteristics 
component may be overstated and the corresponding returns understated, as a result of the omission of group-
specific intercepts (Elder et al., 2010). 
5.	 In conducting the decomposition the same methodological decisions have been taken as with the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition with regard to such aspects as the reference wage structure and the normalisation of 
the dummy variables. 
6.	 The distribution of the population by level of education can affect the wage structure of an economy not only 
through the wage differentials between levels of education, but also through the differences in wage disper-
sion that occur within them, to the extent that in most countries wage dispersion tends to be higher among in-
dividuals with higher levels of education (Martins and Pereira, 2004, Buchinsky, 1994 and Gosling et al., 
2000). Budría and Moro-Egido (2008) show that this situation is intensified in the specific case of Spain 
through educational mismatches, since they tend to increase wage inequality within each group and, moreover, 
their impact tends to grow significantly over time. 
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Resumen 
El artículo analiza las diferencias salariales entre sector público y privado en España a partir de micro-
datos de la Encuesta de Estructura Salarial. La evidencia obtenida aplicando diversas metodologías de 
descomposición muestra la importancia de distinguir por sexo y tipo de contrato y la existencia de una 
diferencia salarial favorable a los trabajadores públicos que se explica, en parte, por sus mejores dota-
ciones de características y, en particular, de las características de los establecimientos. La prima es 
mayor para las mujeres y los temporales y decrece a través de la distribución salarial, siendo negativa 
para los trabajadores más cualificados. 
Palabras clave Brecha salarial entre sector público y privado; distribución salarial; datos emparejados 
empresa-trabajador; métodos de descomposición.
Clasificación JEL C2, E3, J3, J4. 

